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Abstract

In 2017 Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rico. The humanitarian aid
community scrambled a response to support the 3.4 million people affected by the
disaster. In response, thousands of shipping containers filled with supplies were sent to
the island. Numerous reports surfaced regarding significant delays in receiving the
shipments. This research reviews the historical account of cargo throughput into Puerto
Rico following Maria. A computer simulation built in ARENA compares various what-if
scenarios based on empirically collected data and interviews with FEMA, port
authorities, and commercial cargo carriers to determine how the humanitarian supply
chain could improve for future disaster planning. An additional goal of this research is to
better inform humanitarian logisticians who must balance near-term disaster response
demands with long term recovery concerns.
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HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS: SHIPPING DESIGNS FOR THE POST
DISASTER CARGO SURGE

I. Introduction
The Location
Puerto Rico is a U.S. territorial island in the western North Atlantic Ocean. There
are approximately 3.4 million people on the island (US Census Bureau, 2018). The
median household income in Puerto Rico is $19,343, much lower than the U.S. median of
$60,336 (US Census Bureau, 2018). The territory’s primary exports are pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, and medical equipment (US Census Bureau, 2019). By early 2017 the public
utilities were considered degraded from limited funding and a dilapidated infrastructure
(Dooley, 2017). The island relies completely on maritime imports to sustain energy and
to stock general commodities. These imports are processed through one major seaport on
the north side of the island in the city of San Juan. There is a second major port on the
south side of the island in the city of Ponce that is inactive, and a terminal on the east side
of the island in Yabucoa for energy imports. The port of San Juan acts as the primary
lifeline for all of the island’s basic commodity needs.
The 2017 Hurricane Season
Historically, Puerto Rico has been affected by hurricanes about every 3.4 years,
and directly hit by a major hurricane every 20 years (Williams, 2018). On September
20th of 2017, Puerto Rico was hit head on by Hurricane Maria, a category 4 hurricane,
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which crawled across the island over a two-day period. The island’s entire population of
3.4 million people were affected by the storm (World Vision Staff, 2018). Some people
were affected by the loss of public utilities, some displaced from their homes indefinitely,
and over a thousand people were killed (Kessler, 2018).
Hurricane Maria was one of three major hurricanes to affect the U.S. during the
2017 hurricane season (Vaccaro, 2017). Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria all struck
U.S. populations within a few months of each other. Harvey struck Texas on August 25th.
Irma struck the Virgin Islands on September 6th and Florida on September 10th. Maria
struck Puerto Rico on the September 20th. Additionally, four other large storms hit the
U.S. during this same busy season (Vaccaro, 2017). In their 2017 Hurricane Season After
Action Report, the Federal Emergency Management Agency stated,
“The fact that these historic storms occurred concurrently and were followed by
the California Wildfires presented an unprecedented scale of operations,
extremely complex logistics, and numerous novel challenges across the Nation”
(FEMA, 2018:1).
As Hurricane Irma passed Puerto Rico in the beginning of September, much of
the local humanitarian aid safety stock on island was dispatched to support the survival
and recovery efforts going on in the nearby Virgin Islands and elsewhere in the
continental United States. By the time Hurricane Maria hit on September 20th, an
estimated 80,000 people were still without electricity and trying to recover from
Hurricane Irma. Roughly fourteen days after Hurricane Irma, Maria struck Puerto Rico
head on.
Considered the worst natural disaster to affect Puerto Rico in the last 80 years,
Hurricane Maria crawled across the island, ripping it apart with winds up to 155mph
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(World Vision Staff, 2018). The hurricane made landfall in the south east corner of the
island and moved across the center of the island toward the northwest corner (Pasch,
Penny, & Berg, 2017). Several shipping vessels inbound to Puerto Rico were forced to
redirect out of the hurricane’s path (Green, 2018). Mudslides, trees, powerlines and
debris covered the roadways which temporarily shut down the island’s distribution
network. Many of the businesses who rely on large shipments of commodities from the
port of San Juan were temporarily unable to receive shipments, due to the businesses’
lack of power to refrigerate items or degraded facilities that were not fit for warehousing
(Green, 2018).
The island’s transportation network was temporarily crippled. After Hurricane
Maria an island wide fuel shortage ensued and cars were lined up at gas stations waiting
for their turn to get fuel for hours on end (Lubben, 2017). This in turn meant trucking
fleets could not operate at full capacity and drivers couldn’t report to work during a
critical time for supply distribution. Shipping companies brought mobile laundromats,
meals, kitchens, water, blankets, and other care packages and supplies for their
employees and families in order to keep the sea ports running full time (Green, 2018).
Given the setbacks affecting the transportation system in and around Puerto Rico
directly after Hurricane Maria, media reports began to surface claiming that the delivery
of humanitarian aid was shamefully slow (HCMG Editorial, 2017). Patients were in need
of medical supplies and a number of Puerto Rican residents were running out of food and
water which added stress to the situation (Simon et al., 2017). Many of these people
wondered where the humanitarian aid supplies had gone. Meanwhile, at the port of San
Juan, a representative from one of the local shipping companies pointed out a bottleneck
3

in the system by highlighting that there were an estimated ten thousand containers of
supplies sitting at the port filled with food, water, and medicine (Gillespie et al., 2017).
Thousands of containers were indeed sitting in the port of San Juan awaiting delivery
(Green, 2018). Normal freight had been accumulating while awaiting the hurricane’s
passage. Additionally, a surge of freight to replenish what was forecasted in sales from
the disaster was inbound. Furthermore, humanitarian aid organizations began pushing
relief supplies to the island. The simultaneous increases of inbound freight and inbound
humanitarian aid to Puerto Rico was beginning to show, but many wondered why the
freight was not leaving the port as fast as it was arriving.
The major sea freight shipping companies operating out of the port of San Juan
unanimously agreed that freight was not being picked up by the consignees, or end user
customers, nearly as fast as they were prior to the hurricane (Green, 2018). This
transportation delay will be referred to later in the research as customer availability. The
problem many of the businesses faced after the hurricane was reopening without power,
with damaged facilities, and/or with a limited staff. No power meant an inability to keep
refrigerated goods cold, and damaged facilities meant decreased room and security for
warehousing inventory. Thus, the port of San Juan inadvertently turned into a satellite
storage facility for many businesses who were not ready to receive their inbound
shipments (Green, 2018). Businesses who could receive shipments faced the dilemma of
not having enough trucks and drivers available to pick up their goods from the port.
Many of the drivers were still putting their homes back together and getting their families
situated. Additionally, widespread fuel shortages limited the amount of deliveries that
could be completed.
4

The Disaster Response
FEMA is America’s leading governmental organization for disaster relief. FEMA
anticipated the combined danger of Hurricane Maria’s timing behind Hurricane Irma and
the quickly depleting safety stock of humanitarian supplies they had remaining on the
island of Puerto Rico. Thus, FEMA began shipping humanitarian relief supplies prior to
Maria’s impact (Green, 2018). However, with the magnitude of damage and
overwhelming number of people affected, the humanitarian aid community had to
quickly respond to a much larger than anticipated demand for relief.
Shipping humanitarian supplies to Puerto Rico was no easy feat for the
continental United States based humanitarian organizations to complete. Recent
shipments within the continental U.S. to disaster victims of hurricane Harvey in Texas, or
Hurricane Nate in Mississippi had been a much simpler task. For example, if FEMA were
to ship a truckload of food and water to Mississippi, it would have a truck pick up the
supplies from one of their warehouses, and then send the truck to the federal or regional
state-owned staging area. To ship the same truck load of supplies to Puerto Rico, the
supplies are trucked from a federal warehouse and then to the port of Jacksonville
Florida. The supplies are containerized when a container is made available. The container
is then loaded onto a vessel when a vessel becomes available, followed by a five to sixday transit time. Once the vessel arrives at the port of San Juan in Puerto Rico, the vessel
is then offloaded, where the container waits in the yard for another truck to deliver it.
Once a truck and driver are available, the container is loaded onto the truck and then
dispatched to a federal staging area. At the federal staging area, the container can be
unloaded and the supplies can be broken down into smaller straight trucks. The straight
5

trucks are then sent to regional staging areas owned by the state, at which point the state
decides which delivery site needs supplies the most and distributes accordingly. The key
point is that the total number of touch points required to get humanitarian supplies to the
intended destination increases when shipping to an island versus within the mainland.
Thus, added opportunities for delivery delays occur.
The Research Question
The reacting surge of humanitarian aid supplies took longer than desired to reach
the intended recipients. The disaster response phase continued for several months as
back-to-back shipments of food, water, blue tarp roofing, fuel, service vehicles, and other
supplies were being coordinated out of the port of Jacksonville, Florida (Green, 2018). As
the disaster response phase slowly evolved into the recovery phase, statements were
surfacing across the media that implied the humanitarian aid community was handling the
aftermath of Hurricane Maria poorly. Example headlines included: “Puerto Rico aid is
trapped in thousands of shipping containers” (Gillespie et al., 2017), “…Logistical
Failings Have Stalled Hurricane Maria Recovery Efforts” (SupplyChainX, 2018), and
“Logistics Challenges Hinder Hurricane Maria Recovery” (APICS, 2017). Over a year
later humanitarian aid organizations have continued to assist the island in recovery
efforts. The extensive lead times involved in the delivery of humanitarian aid has led to
the following research question: How did the supply chain design and carrier choice
affect the delivery of humanitarian response and recovery cargo after Hurricane Maria?
Answering this research question will help prepare Puerto Rico for future disaster
response and recovery. Also, the research question applies to other island territories who
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face similar logistical struggles during the disaster response and recovery phases.
Furthermore, answering the research question will assist FEMA in achieving their goals
for logistics improvement as explained in the FEMA 2017 hurricane season after action
report. The objectives of the report were to increase transportation planning,
management, and contract support capacities, quickly deliver key commodities,
streamline movement across multiple modes of transportation that facilitate and speed
recovery, and develop a more comprehensive understanding of supply chains to support
rapid restoration to catastrophic incidents (FEMA, 2018).
A simulation analysis was chosen to answer the research question. In order to
build the simulation, the supply chain in and around the Port of San Juan in Puerto is
examined. The research focuses on maritime shipments, which comprised the bulk of the
disaster response cargo. The goal of the research is to derive conclusions as to how the
humanitarian supply chain timeline could have been improved.
The paper will continue with a literature review of relevant topics surrounding the
research question, methodology, and how the methodology was employed for this
research. The research results and analysis will then be discussed. Lastly, the paper ends
with conclusions and recommendations based on empirical data gathered in Puerto Rico,
available literature, and the simulation’s quantitative output.
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II. Literature Review
The literature review will first explain the disaster management continuum of
recovery. Supply chain improvement and success measures will then be discussed,
followed by considerations within the context of humanitarian logistics. Next, FEMA’s
disaster management tactics and capabilities are reviewed with respect to Hurricane
Maria. Lastly, literature about the simulation methodology is discussed.
The Continuum of Recovery
Two of the core phases in any disaster management model include disaster
response and disaster recovery. This research focuses on those two phases in particular
and their logistical impact surrounding the event of Hurricane Maria. Carter (2008)
explains that a response phase consists of measures taken immediately prior to and
following disaster impact that are directed toward saving life and protecting property.
Carter (2008) goes on to explain that unlike the response phase, the recovery phase is a
longer process marked by restoration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction efforts. It is
important to note that in this research the response and recovery phases are both involved
in the data used, since the two phases often overlap one another. As the response or
rescue phase draws down, the longer-term community recovery efforts ramp up. The
overlap of the response and recovery phases is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Continuum of Recovery (MacDonald et al., 2015)
Supply Chain Improvement
The supply chain “is an essential part of humanitarian aid operations” (Agostinho,
2013:210). Supply chains are composed of several chain links of suppliers and providers.
To answer the research question of how a supply chain could be improved, one must first
ask what makes a humanitarian supply chain successful? Yadav & Barve (2015) claim
that the 'agile humanitarian supply chain' is an indication of the most successful supply
chains, which builds on the shoulders of continuous process improvement systems. Agile
can be defined as “the ability of a supply chain to rapidly respond to changes in market
and customer demands” (Jain, Benyoucef, & Deshmukh, 2008:367). This is in part
achieved by way of data analysis and forecasting of demand. However, customer
demands during the response phase can be very difficult to estimate. Beamon (1999)
9

proposes three measures to assess a supply chain’s performance that will be adapted for
this study: resource measures (R), output measures (O), and flexibility measures (F).
Resource measures will be assessed in this study as queue lengths and times, output
measures will be assessed as the total volume of freight moving through the supply chain,
and flexibility measures will be assessed as the supply chain’s reaction to change.
One option for improving delivery times during the response phase is to have
safety stock in prepositioned warehouses. Prepositioning inventory “can enhance the
responsiveness of relief chains, but decrease the cost-eﬃciency because of high inventory
costs” (Ali Torabi, Shokr, Tofighi, & Heydari, 2018:143). At the time of Hurricane Maria
FEMA owned a warehouse for pre-positioned inventory in Puerto Rico. However, the
inventory was depleted two weeks prior to Maria to support the victims in the Virgin
Islands impacted by Hurricane Irma. With respect to the research question for this study,
pre-positioned inventory would expedite the delivery of supplies during the response
phase. As of early 2019 FEMA is reportedly looking to open more warehouses with prepositioned inventory in the Puerto Rican area to better prepare the Caribbean region for
future disaster-prone seasons. Therefore, this research will focus more on the
transportation between supply nodes during the response and recovery phases, and how
that can be improved based on the case of Hurricane Maria as an isolated event.
Hurricane Maria’s Logistics
A 2017 report out of MIT highlighted some of the various components involved
in Hurricane Maria’s post disaster logistics timeline in the following statement: “Drivers,
trucks, containers, roads, telecommunications, fuel, power, and more were all equally-
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important elements in the system. Shortages or reduced capacity in any of these
subsystems created shortages or reduced capacity for the entire system” (Goentzel et al.,
2017:11). The idea of reducing throughput capacity in one subsystem affecting capacity
for the entire system is derived from the Theory of Constraints (TOC). TOC involves
defining a system’s goal, performance measures, and constraints, and then seeks to
optimize the system by leveraging those features (Goldratt & Cox, 2014). The TOC is a
lens through which this research’s method will be built. The identification of constraints,
or bottlenecks, will be key to the recreation of the historical account of aid shipments to
Puerto Rico. Transportation bottlenecks such as port processing capacity, weather delays
for vessels, vessel capacity, road delivery delays, and customer availability are all
considered in the method design.
FEMA’s primary logistical mission is to, “deliver the right resources to the right
place at the right time in support of state, local, tribal governments and territories”
(FEMA, 2015:1). “Saving lives takes priority and, given the unknown scale of any event
in the early hours, it makes sense to estimate worst-case demand for relief supplies”
(Goentzel et al., 2017:10). FEMA accomplishes a big, fast, and smart response by way of
pre-negotiated contracts with logistics and commodity providers in order to meet the
relative surge demands of a given disaster. Additionally, FEMA maintains caches of
safety stock that are ready to distribute but does not maintain their own trucking or
maritime logistics fleets. During the surge of disaster response, a large amount of
transportation capacity is needed, which is the area of focus for this research. FEMA did
not have a surge fleet available to call on during Hurricane Maria. Thus, FEMA was
wholly reliant on the available maritime shipping carriers that service Puerto Rico.
11

Transportation is left to the private sector experts who execute transportation functions
daily with their pre-established routes and infrastructure. Humanitarian organizations are
recommended to take a supervisory role instead of running the transportation network
(Wang, Wu, Liang, & Huang, 2016). This research reviews the major transportation
providers available during the event of Hurricane Maria with respect to the delivery of
humanitarian aid to Puerto Rico.
Computer Simulation Analysis
This research was conducted using a quantitative approach through a computer
simulation. Empirical data was collected to inform the simulation model and to interpret
the simulation results. The simulation serves as the major component of data analysis.
Simulations are ideal for exploring the relationships between variables (Chandrasekaran,
Linderman, & Sting, 2018). The simulation method in research provides a cost-effective
means of testing hypothetical scenarios, especially in this case with a large supply chain
containing multiple transportation providers over land and ocean. Simulation is used to
“investigate a wide variety of what if questions about the real-world system” (Banks, et
al., 2010:3). Simulations are subject to their scope and limitations, but “are a good
starting point in any planning process” (Banomyong & Sopadang, 2010:720). The results
of this simulation could be considered in the humanitarian aid community’s planning
process in preparation for future disaster seasons. Simulations are also “one of the most
widely used operations-research and management-science techniques, if not the most
widely used” (Law & Kelton, 1991:2). When exact information can be acquired, an
analytical study can be used with mathematical methods (Law & Kelton, 1991).
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However, the real-world system being modeled in this research is complex, and the data
acquired are estimates from experts. Thus, instead of mathematical methods, a simulation
becomes an ideal methodology to employ in this case.
Literature Summary
Response and recovery are two distinct phases of disaster management that
overlap. Supply chains are essential to humanitarian operations. Increasing safety stock,
pre-positioned inventory, and awareness of the supply chain as a whole are typical
actions to improve responsiveness. FEMA’s tactic during disaster response is to surge.
Transportation requirements are normally fulfilled by to the private sector. Finally, the
research approach is a simulation used to explore alternative scenarios.
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III. Methodology
The methodology begins by outlining the data collection process. Interviews laid
the foundation for the simulation process map and data points. The historical context
through the eyes of the interviewees is captured to best interpret the results of the
simulation. The simulation’s mechanics are then explained. The simulation’s
assumptions, limitations, and intended features in recreating the historical account are
highlighted throughout the chapter. Lastly, scenarios designed for testing within the
model are delineated.
Data Collection
The data collection process was initialized through a contact with FEMA
headquarters in Washington, DC. The simulation method was chosen to examine the
entirety of the historical account in motion and to compare values. A draft simulation
model was created based on available information on the web about the port of San Juan
in Puerto Rico, the port of Jacksonville in Florida, and from sea port research by Franzén
& Streling (2017). The simulation was developed using Arena simulation software
(Rockwell Automation, 2019). Contact was then made with the FEMA personnel in
Puerto Rico to discuss the best way to collect empirical data to refine and inform the
model. A list of stakeholders was generated surrounding the humanitarian logistics of
Hurricane Maria and forwarded to the FEMA Puerto Rico logistics team as shown in
Table 1. Attempts were made by both FEMA and the researcher to make contact with all
parties listed.
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Table 1. Interview Contact List

Process Role
Alternate port
Carrier
Carrier
Carrier
Carrier
Disaster management
Disaster management
Land distribution
Land distribution
Port
Port
Port of origin

Contacts

Interviewed

Port of the Americas Authority - Ponce
Crowley
NYK
Tote
Trailer Bridge
FEMA Puerto Rico logistics team
State Disaster Management Agency
Transportation and Freeway Authority
National Guard
Maritime Transport Authority
Port Authority - San Juan
JAX

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

Meetings were held in the FEMA operations center in Puerto Rico in December
of 2018. Empirical data was collected using written notes and guided discussions from
the simulation model. Suggested edits and data estimates for the simulation model were
acquired. Specific details of the methodology and data collection process can be found in
the appendices.
Data Findings
The entities in this simulation are shipping container Twenty-foot Equivalent
Units (TEUs). Note that many of the containers shipped to Puerto Rico are actually 53’
foot container trailers, on a Roll On Roll Off (RORO) style barge (Green, 2018).
However, the industry representatives interviewed provided container totals that are
calculated into TEU equivalents for data consistency.
The three major domestic carriers who service Puerto Rico are TOTE Maritime,
Crowley Logistics, and Trailer Bridge. There are other international carriers who service
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Puerto Rico as well, but they are excluded from the research due to the Jones Act. The
Jones Act requires that vessels traveling between two US ports be U.S. flagged, owned,
and crewed (66th U.S. Congress, 1920). In the interviews it was reported that the three
major maritime domestic carriers servicing Puerto Rico out of the port of Jacksonville,
had a divided share of the total throughput of freight as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Major Domestic Carriers Servicing Puerto Rico

Crowley and TOTE each move an estimated 1800 TEUs per week, and Trailer
Bridge moves an estimated 900 TEUs per week. The estimated containers moved per
week are used as a baseline for a set of entities called normal freight within the
simulation. Normal freight entities, or TEUs are created during the entire simulation and
considered the pre-hurricane every day demand flow. When combined, the weekly TEUs
moved by all three carrier equalled 4500 TEUs. The division of those 4500 TEUs is
considered the unit market share breakdown, shown in Figure 2 as the 40%, 40%, and
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20% divided share. This division will be referred to later in the research as the 40/40/20
split.
Immediately after Hurricane Maria, all carriers experienced a 45% increase in
TEU throughput, independent of humanitarian aid (HA) TEUs. That normal demand
increase then declined and stabilized at a net 20% increase for the next year. The average
amount of TEUs carried per vessel, the fleet sizes before and after Hurricane Maria, and
the travel time for vessels are all featured in Table 2.
Table 2. Carrier Shipping Data

FEMA’s HA cargo was shipped via a pre-negotiated contract with Crowley. Prenegotiated contracts are common for FEMA, since it is a means to improve
responsiveness and sort out many of the contracting details prior to a moment of crisis
(Thornton, 2017). HA cargo started flowing to Puerto Rico seven days prior to the
hurricane in response to Hurricane Irma and totaled 8000 TEUs.
Modeling
An extensive review of the simulation model was completed upon returning from
Puerto Rico. The model was refined to recreate the historical account of Hurricane Maria
by modeling the actual supply chain available and incorporating the feedback of
interviewees regarding the process model. After adding the actual data points obtained
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from the interviews, the model was tuned to produce salient features of the historical
event as described by the interviewees.
The simulation model revolves around the concept of entities that enter the system
model at a specified arrival rate, and then pass through processes where they seize
resources required for process completion while being subject to processing times and
queues. Entities encounter conditional rerouting events based on system attributes during
the simulation runtime. The system’s flow finishes at a disposal on the far-right side of
the model where an entity’s journey is completed. The simulation run parameters can be
set for a specified length and can be run multiple times to compare values and obtain
averages.

Figure 3. Simulation Model Overview
The overarching process flow for the research simulation designed is depicted in
Figure 3. The three major carriers each have their own normal demand for cargo modeled
within the simulation that is independent of HA cargo. After TEUs from the normal
demand enter the system, they queue at the port of Jacksonville in the respective carrier’s
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yard. The TEUs are then processed into batches and queue to be loaded onto vessels.
Once aboard a vessel, TEUs wait the specified transit time from Jacksonville to the port
of San Juan in Puerto Rico. Once arriving in Puerto Rico, the TEUs queue to be offloaded
from the vessel. When TEUs are processed off of the vessels they then queue to be
loaded onto trucks. After a TEU is loaded onto a truck, the truck completes its delivery
and the TEU exits the model. HA TEUs follow the same process flow as normal TEUs in
the model. However, which carrier HA TEUs are allocated to is adjustable.
Fleet sizes increased one week after the hurricane in response to increased
demand. A frequent comment from the carriers, was that they can always find more ships
to move containers. They have no concern for total capacity and they will find a way to
move the containers assigned to them. Shipping delays were also built into the simulation
to model the effects of the hurricane on waterways, roadway obstructions, and customer
availability for receiving cargo immediately after the hurricane.
Model Validation
A series of variables was programmed for recording into a spreadsheet to ensure
the model recreated the historical account of Hurricane Maria as it was described during
the interviews. The variables are recorded daily and measure how many TEUs are in the
system, how many TEUs are in each queue, and whether or not a system delay has been
activated. The model was tested for one simulated year with 100 replications. The
variables were used to verify no infinite queues existed and that salient milestones within
the logistical account of Hurricane Maria were being met.
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Following model validation that the baseline simulation was reflecting what was
understood to be reality, a follow up phone conference was scheduled with the FEMA
personnel to validate the model with expert opinion. It was determined in the phone
conference that the port of Ponce needed good representation in the model as a possible
option for future HA delivery to Puerto Rico. Otherwise, the conversation concluded that
the model was meeting all other salient features of the historical event and that after
Ponce was added as a shipping option for HA in the model, it would be time to press
forward with running tests.
Ponce
The addition of Ponce, also known as the Rafael Cordero Santiago Puerto de las
Americas (Google Maps, 2019), was constructed in the model similar to the three major
carriers represented. The general idea of Ponce as a shipping option is completely
hypothetical at this point. There is no specific data that clarifies Ponce’s throughput
capacity to the researcher’s knowledge. This is due to the fact that Ponce currently has no
demand. It is a large and beautiful port that was built as an economic expansion for
Puerto Rico that has yet to attract sustained business investments in the local area. There
are two gantry cranes in Ponce that were pending maintenance as of the time of the
interviews held, a mobile crane, space for 3 vessels, room for 8000 containers when
stacked four high, and hook ups for refrigerated containers. The port was open for
business the day after the hurricane passed and cleared by the coast guard for business.
Lift On Lift Off (LOLO) barges like those owned by Trailer Bridge are able to arrive at
ports like Ponce and use their own cranes to unload their own vessels. Crowley was asked
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to make some of their deliveries out of Ponce, but after a cost analysis they quickly found
it much cheaper to use their own terminal, employees, and equipment out of San Juan and
then truck the containers across the island where needed. All carriers interviewed
preferred their own terminals over having to operate out of Ponce. It made no sense for
the carriers to relocate their sea port operations across the island in terms of cost and
efficiency. Military Sealift Command was reported to have berthed several times at
Ponce after Hurricane Maria to deliver shipments. The thought of the government using
the port of Ponce as an independent location from San Juan during the interviews was
deliberated. The discussion led to the speculative conclusion that if the surge of HA
TEUs were shipped through Ponce they would not delay shipments intended for
economic recovery in San Juan. The use of Ponce as an alternative port would deconflict
the two surges of normal TEUs and HA TEUs.
Scenarios Designed for Simulation
Once the model was completed and the baseline simulation results validated with
FEMA, several scenarios were designed. The scenarios are shown in Table 3. Scenario
run refers to the label of each unique scenario designed for simulation. The incremental
changes in the model are highlighted in the next six columns to the right of the scenario
labels.
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Table 3. Scenarios Designed for Simulation

Scenario Run
Model validation
0 - base 1 may
1 - base 11 sep
2 - no bayamon
3 - HA one third
4 - HA 40/40/20
5 - road delay doubled
6 - customer availability 10%
7 - customer availability 90%
8 - HA through Ponce

Sim
duration
(weeks)
52
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12

Hurricane
activated
x
no
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Bayamon
opened HA routing
x
Cr 100%
N/A
N/A
x
Cr 100%
no
Cr 100%
no
33/33/33%
no
40/40/20%
x
Cr 100%
x
Cr 100%
x
Cr 100%
N/A
Po 100%

Road
delays
48hrs
48hrs
48hrs
48hrs
48hrs
48hrs
96hrs
48hrs
48hrs
48hrs

Customer
availability
40%
40%
40%
40%
40%
40%
40%
10%
90%
40%

The first simulation created that is labeled model validation was run for 52 weeks
to ensure no infinite queues or unrealistic conditions exited. The simulation is then
scoped to a twelve week window for a closer comparative analysis among scenario
results. Scenario zero was run several months prior to the hurricane to obtain the twelve
week baseline data with no hurricane. Scenario one slides the twelve weeks to start a
week and a half prior to the hurricane to capture the hurricane and its effects in the
historical context. Scenario two looks at what would happen if Bayamon was never made
available for Crowley. Scenario three splits the HA shipments evenly among the three
major domestic carriers: TOTE, Crowley, and Trailer Bridge instead of 100% to
Crowley. Scenario four splits the HA shipments identical to the island’s normal freight
unit market share breakdown allocating 40% to TOTE, 40% to Crowley, and 20% to
Trailer Bridge. Scenario five explores what would happen if road delays for trucks
exiting the ports were doubled. Scenario six reduces the percentage of customers able to
receive cargo for the first two weeks following the hurricane to 10%, in other words only
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10% of cargo leaves the port each day. Scenario seven improves the customer availability
for receiving cargo to 90%. Scenario eight routes all HA shipments through Ponce via an
external fourth carrier to explore the effect of fully deconflicting HA and normal demand
shipments on island. Resulting simulation output for each scenario is discussed in chapter
four.
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IV. Analysis and Results
The data analysis is conducted with several aims in mind. First, the analysis aims
to find differences across the simulation’s queues, total inventory levels, and reaction to
change. Second, having identified the differences among simulations, the analysis seeks
to ultimately answer the research question. Since the data used to inform the simulation is
based on general estimates from industry experts, a specific target number of replications
was incalculable since no variance could be derived. The first simulation was replicated
100 times. Then, the same simulation was run 25 times and results were nearly identical.
All other simulations were likewise run with 25 replications. The simulation output
yielded a large amount of data, thus aggregate charts are shown for comparative analysis
among simulations. The base data and all other ARENA output are included in the
appendices.
Queues
Figure 4 and Figure 5 indicate the wait times and lengths of queues in each
scenario. Both figures sum the results of all TEU types within the model. TEU types
include normal demand TEUs from Crowley, normal demand TEUs from TOTE, normal
demand TEUs from Trailer Bridge, and HA TEUs. Figure 4 compares how many hours a
TEU will wait on average in queues during the scenario. Figure 5 compares how many
TEUs on average are waiting in a queue during the scenario. Ponce is included as a fourth
shipping carrier in all scenarios. Weighted averages take into consideration when Ponce
has zero TEUs assigned, so as not to inflate results with added system capacity when
Ponce is used. From these two figures we see that TEUs wait in faster and smaller queues
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in scenarios three, four, and eight. The summed average queue times are weighted using
the following formula:
𝑗

𝑛𝑗
𝑛𝑖
𝑛1
𝑛2
∑ 𝑡𝑖 ( ) = 𝑡1 ( ) + 𝑡2 ( ) … 𝑡𝑗 ( )
𝑁
𝑁
𝑁
𝑁

(1)

𝑖=1

Where t is the average queue times, n is the number in queue, and N is the total number in
all queues.

Figure 4. Average Time TEUs Collectively Wait in Queues
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Figure 5. Number of TEUs Collectively Waiting in Queues
Total System Times
Total system times refers to the total amount of time it takes for a TEU to
complete shipment. When averages for all TEU total times are weighted for all TEU
types combined, there are still distinguishing characteristics among scenarios. Figure 6
shows the average total time that each TEU type takes to process through the entire
model. Figure 6 then finds the weighted average for those total times based on how many
TEUs each TEU type represents. TEU types can take more or less time than others types
to transit the system depending on how busy each carrier or delivery route is within the
model. Thus, the totals in Figure 6 highlight how TEUs spend a combined 19-20 hours
less during scenarios four and eight to complete their journey on average. Interestingly,
scenario seven is comparable to scenario three, indicating that customer availability has a
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similar impact to carrier design on overall TEU delivery times. This is also apparent in
Scenario six where limited customer availability raises the combined times for TEUs up
by an outstanding 61 hours from the base scenario.

Figure 6. Average Time Required for TEUs to Complete Shipment
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Surge Duration
A look at the curve of the TEU surge over time shows how long the system takes
to return to a normal steady state. The total amount of all TEUs within a scenario are
recorded daily and charted in Figure 7. Scenario one processes the surge and returns to a
normal throughput baseline and system inventory level of about 5000-6000 TEUs per day
75 days after the simulation begins. Scenarios two and five are not shown as they do not
add value to this analysis. Scenarios three and four return to the throughput baseline 50
days after the simulation begins, 25 days faster than scenario one or almost a month
sooner. Scenario three is slightly higher than four. In scenario three the smaller of the
three carriers for this simulation, Trailer Bridge, is slightly overwhelmed by the 33%
allocation of HA TEUs. In scenario four when Trailer Bridge is allocated 20% of the
TEUs commensurate with the normal demand unit market share breakdown, Trailer
Bridge is able to keep pace with the other carriers. If Trailer Bridge were configured with
more vessels in the simulation similar to Crowley, they would match throughput and
inventory levels. Scenario six shows a much higher spike in the total system inventory
level, due to poor customer availability, and resolves the surge 82 days after the
simulation starts.
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Figure 7. Daily System Inventory
Scenario eight lingers around 8000 for about 20 days and then starts declining
toward a system steady state. However, a closer look at scenario eight shows that the
surge could be resolved and the inventory returned to a normal steady state after 40 days
if it were not for the inventory levels at Ponce. Figure 8 shows scenario eight by itself,
with all TEU types represented within that scenario by carrier. Inventory levels at Ponce
drive the second curve in scenario eight’s total system inventory levels. The TEU
processing times at Ponce were configured similar to Trailer Bridge, since Trailer Bridge
is the smallest of the three carriers featured in this research and best representative of a
carrier company that would operate out of Ponce. However, the real-world processing
times in Ponce are completely relative because there are no data estimates to work with.
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Ponce is a big beautiful port with close to no business at this time. As discussed
previously, it was designed as an economic expansion to the island but has yet to take off.
Thus, any deductions from scenario eight are truly relative to a carrier’s ability to run
operations out of Ponce. Pros and cons of operating HA reception out of Ponce will be
discussed further in chapter five.

Figure 8. System Inventory by Carrier during Scenario 8
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V. Conclusions
Chapter V further addresses how carrier design, alternative port, and customer
availability findings impacted the Hurricane Maria response. Conclusive
recommendations based on the simulation results and empirical data are then applied to
the governmental and the global humanitarian audiences. Future research and limitations
from the study are then discussed.
Finding 1 – The 40/40/20 split
Scenario four was configured to distribute HA TEUs amongst the three major
domestic carriers in a way that reflects the unit market share between them. The
proportionate distribution allowed all three carriers to return to a normal baseline of
inventory throughput levels sooner than other scenarios. The distribution did not overload
any particular carrier and minimized queue times and sizes. The proportionate
distribution idea is also valid for future carrier selection. The future distribution
percentages of HA TEUs would generally mirror the evolved unit market share for the
region as it changes over time. Using the 40/40/20 split method also leverages the
benefits of using pre-existing carriers who are experts at serving the customer base in that
region. Discretion in the distribution would be required in the event that one or more of
the carriers experience a reduced capacity or reduced operational effectiveness due to the
effects of a disaster. However, carriers already have the vessels, cranes, manning,
training, and trucking networks established and operating. Using a carrier also means
leveraging that carrier’s resources and connections on site to get the job done, with no
additional startup times and costs.
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Finding 2 – Hypothetical Impact of Ponce

Figure 9. Picture of the Port in Ponce
The idea of using Ponce completely deconflicts the two surges of normal TEUs
and HA TEUs. Results in the scenarios for Ponce were quantitatively compelling,
however data estimates used to drive Ponce were derived from the other carriers. There
are no expert industry estimates for Ponce since there is close to no activity there. It has
an 8000 TEU capacity and is normally empty. The question in using Ponce becomes one
of how fast the port can be brought online and at what cost? Longshoreman and
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serviceable equipment have to be acquired to unload vessels. The two red gantry cranes
shown in Figure 9 were offline, pending maintenance. This had been the case for some
time when the data was collected. A carrier willing to berth at Ponce must be found. A
trucking fleet willing to operate out of Ponce that can handle the mountain ranges that
stretch across the center of the island must be organized. Simulation eight was designed
under the assumption that operations out of Ponce could begin immediately after the
hurricane similar to the other carriers in the port of San Juan. If there is a start-up time
associated with opening Ponce post-disaster, then that start up time introduces a potential
opportunity cost of lost time that could have been used to ship HA TEUs via the preexisting domestic carriers. Furthermore, any start up times would increase the total times
reported for scenario eight in the analysis. Regardless, Ponce is the primary alternative to
San Juan. If a boat sunk in the entryway to San Juan or if a disaster caused sufficient
damage to San Juan, nothing would get in or out. The lifeline to Puerto Rico would be
cut. Thus, Ponce is a prime target for further research.
Finding 3 – Customer Availability
When comparing total system inventory levels over time, customer availability
was shown to have a large impact. Carriers can process containers into the port at any
rate, but are unable to process containers out if customers are unable to receive them.
Thus, returning key business online immediately after a disaster has a high impact on
freight delays. This applies to all TEUs as they will be caught in longer queues and fuller
ports. Ports that are backed up with containers need more time to sort and load them onto
trucks. A busy yard was one of the primary reasons why Crowley opened Bayamon. The
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Crowley yard morphed into a satellite storage for customers unable to accept cargo and
the HA TEUs had to be placed somewhere accessible for further processing to FEMA’s
staging areas. When ports are online, but businesses have been heavily affected by a
disaster like Hurricane Maria, then restoring customer availability becomes a priority for
unblocking the flow of containers.
Recommendations for the U.S. State and Federal Levels
Divide a surge of humanitarian aid among the available carriers appropriately. Doing so
requires awareness of the unit market share breakdown and awareness of the potential
effect of the disaster on the carriers that may reduce their effectiveness. Appropriate
contracting processes and supportive culture are also required that will enable logistics
planners the freedom to leverage all available transportation capacity in the system. Prenegotiation in contracting needs to maintain a sufficient level of flexibility to optimize
throughput.
Explore secondary ports and shipping locations. Logistics planners need increased
awareness of infrastructure readiness, the cost of operations, and the comparative speed
of operations for an alternative port versus using pre-existing carriers who already service
the region. Acquiring this data will better enable logistics planners to leverage all options.
Using an alternative port like Ponce can deconflict any normal TEUs from HA TEUs,
however the results in this study are relative to an external carrier’s ability to bring the
port online and sustain a competitive operations tempo.
Encourage businesses to prepare and rehearse a post disaster recovery plan to normalize
operations as fast as possible after a disaster. Customer availability was shown to have a
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large impact on the TEU surge duration across the system. Getting businesses back online
and ready to receive freight will help unblock masses of TEUs stuck at the port. This
research shows that an investment in preparation for commercial entities has a direct
impact on post-disaster distribution and the ultimate length of the response phase.
Recommendations for the Global Humanitarian Community
For the humanitarian response community, it is important to remember that when
surging aid into an isolated region, the total available system capacity must be
recognized. Additionally, aid shipments should be divided to reflect market realities. A
knowledge of which carriers are available, the general unit market share breakdown, and
post-disaster carrier effectiveness will assist in carrier selection. Throughput is enhanced
when the total system capacity is leveraged and customer availability to receive
shipments is quickly restored.
Future Research
The feasibility of Ponce as an alternative shipping location requires additional
research. Interviews should be conducted with local industry representatives to
understand all facets of operations in the area. The time and cost required to bring the
port online should be analyzed and compared to the time and cost of using pre-existing
commercial carriers in the region. Recruited vessels and carriers will need to be
compatible with Ponce’s infrastructure and resource conditions.
The distribution of HA TEUs on land after initial delivery from the sea-ports is
another area of future research. The scope of all the research conducted in this thesis,
only covers the first black arrow in Figure 10. That includes all TEUs sent from FEMA to
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the Federal Staging Areas. TEUs arrive at the Federal Staging Areas (FSA) after being
trucked out of the port. Once TEUs arrive at the FSAs, aid is unloaded from the TEUs,
organized, prioritized, and reloaded into different trucks for onward movement. After the
FSAs there are Regional Staging Areas (RSA) where ownership of the aid is handed off
from the federal to the state level. After the RSAs, aid is prioritized again and
redistributed to the Points of Delivery (POD) where the aid is delivered to the disaster
victims. A large network of land distribution could be modeled into the current
simulation, however sufficient data could not be obtained.

Figure 10. Example Federal Aid Distribution Chain
Limitations
The simulation was built on estimates from interviewees. No hard data was
acquired that specified exactly when each container arrived and how much. Interviews
were held with CEOs, vice presidents, commanders, port authority directors, and FEMA
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logisticians. Their estimates informed the model. However, the researcher was unable to
acquire exact data which would have added an element of preciseness to the model.
As mentioned in the future research, the trucking network was not modeled after
the Federal Staging Areas (FSA). This was due to the lack of unified representation for
the trucking industry in Puerto Rico. The trucking industry is very divided and
independently owned. There was no union or collective representative that was available
during the interview timeframe to provide additional data. The trucking network on
Puerto Rico in itself is complex and essential to the delivery of aid. There are potentially
many more untapped lessons learned if the trucking network were researched further.
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Appendix A – Data Collection Agenda
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Appendix B – Simulation Logic
The port of Jacksonville, Florida (JAX) was contacted by phone and email to
request a specific query from their shipping database. They were unable to fulfill the
request and referred the researcher to an outside company for data reporting called IHS
Markit. IHS Markit provided a price quote for nine months of cargo data, from June of
2017 to February of 2018, covering exports to Puerto Rico and imports from Puerto Rico
to the port of JAX with shipment vessel names, metric tons, and shipping container
twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). Unfortunately, the price point was well beyond the
available funding for this research, so average figures for the simulation data input were
obtained based on the responses of the interviewees instead. The inability to obtain the
raw data is noted as a limitation of this study for preciseness in the simulation model.
The FEMA Puerto Rico Logistics team scheduled meetings with available
contacts during the week of 3-Dec-2017 to 7-Dec-2017. Contacts who were unavailable
for meetings were not able to provide input on the simulation model. For those who were
available for meetings, a three foot by four foot print out of the simulation model was
prepared in advance and presented during the meetings to guide discussions for model
corrections and to gather available data for input to the model. The simulation model will
be discussed at length later in this chapter. The researcher flew out from Ohio to Puerto
Rico to meet with the FEMA Puerto Rico team and to lead meetings with each of the
scheduled parties. The meetings were held in a conference room within the FEMA
operating facility in the city of Guaynabo each day. Organizations were scheduled to
meet at different times and days. Each group had their own block of time, no overlap with
other interviewees, and no one else to compete with during discussions. All interviews
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were conducted in person and with two FEMA Puerto Rico Logistics team members:
Jose-Rivera Solis and Derek “Doc” Abbott. The FEMA employees took their own
personal notes, welcomed each group of interviewees, and added their own questions
during the interviews. The loose structure of the meetings created a relaxing atmosphere
where the interviewees were able to share as much or as little as they wanted. The FEMA
team was already acquainted with most of the interviewees due to the working
relationship FEMA has with the stakeholders already on the island of Puerto Rico. Notes
were taken of each interview by the researcher and both FEMA representatives
previously mentioned. Contact information was acquired for each interviewee for follow
up questions. The visit to Puerto Rico included a tour of the port of San Juan and the
Crowley shipping yards, to validate the simulation model and clarify remaining questions
in the process. Notes were assimilated each night after the meetings and categorized into
a table to compare values.
Creation nodes are depicted as irregular pentagons in ARENA. After creation, HA
entities then enter a decision node, depicted as a diamond, that is set to route a specified
percentage of the HA to the four delivery routes constructed in the model. The four
delivery routes are via TOTE, Trailer Bridge, Crowley, or by an external carrier through
the port of Ponce. The decision node for carrier selection is used as a throttle that is
adjusted differently for the individual simulation scenarios.
To model the change in normal freight demand, two more creation nodes were
added to each carrier. One called “normal surge” to inject additional normal freight into
each carrier’s portion of the simulation that simulates the 45% total freight increase,
which starts at the same time as the HA cargo and shuts off after 3 weeks. The next
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creation node added was called “normal recovery” which likewise injects additional
normal freight to simulate the 20% total freight increase into each carrier and acts like
normal surge but begins when normal surge ends. “Normal” in this context simply refers
to a TEU that is not HA cargo; in other words, it is destined for one of the regular
customers that the respective carrier deals with regularly.
The base model allocates 100% of the HA TEUs to Crowley. Given FEMA’s
strategy to surge HA cargo during a disaster to avert true humanitarian catastrophes
(Goentzel et al., 2017), the interarrival rate for the HA TEUs within the simulation were
given an exponential distribution. The containers are then processed using a standardized
port processing time (PPT) derived from interview responses that is sufficient to maintain
a steady state of cargo throughput from the recovery phase indefinitely. PPTs were
reported to allow a barge to be downloaded within 4 hours. Since there is no data
available regarding the internal processes of the carriers, a PPT of 0.012308 hours with
one simulation resource was designed and generalized across the ports. The generalized
PPT is calculated by dividing the 4 hours required to download a vessel by the 325 TEUs
on the vessel. The resulting number provides how long it takes to process each container.
These numbers are based on responses from Trailer Bridge, who was willing to share
specifically how long it takes for them to offload vessels. After completing the JAX PPT,
entities progress to a following queue for batching onto a barge or ship. The number of
containers that can be carried on each of the vessels, the number of vessels available, and
the speed of the vessels is relative to each carrier as reported in the interviews.
After the entities are batched for shipment, they either continue from the first
diamond in the model from left to right to the upper track with the pre-hurricane normal
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number of vessels available for processing and transit times or get rerouted to a different
processing node on the lower track that has the increased number of vessels available.
The increased number of vessels allows for more batches of TEUs to be processed
simultaneously. The entities are rerouted to the increased fleet size based on a conditional
event where a variable within the system is changed from zero to one. A switch basically,
flips at a specified time and reroutes all entities to the increased fleet size processing
nodes with their added vessel resources available for processing more batches of entities.
In either transit process through normal fleet sizes or increased fleet sizes, the duration of
travel time is relative to the type of vessel used.
Once entities complete their travel time through the western Atlantic Ocean from
JAX to the port of San Juan in Puerto Rico, there is a second conditional event where all
cargo is rerouted to a holding node when the hurricane is triggered within the simulation.
A switch is flipped that lasts for 48 hours on 20 Sep-2017 of the simulation to represent
the passing of Hurricane Maria over the island. During this time all container traffic
aboard ships and on delivery trucks is halted temporarily. The seaports open after the 48
hours pass, since the carriers all commented that they were relatively unaffected at the
ports and were able to resume operations within hours of the hurricane clearing.
Entities are unbatched or offloaded from vessels upon arrival in Puerto Rico and
are processed onto trucks for delivery. The rate of processing for the Puerto Rican side
for vessel offload and truck onload, mirrors that of the JAX side for truck offload and
vessel onload as previously mentioned to maintain the steady state across the simulation.
Once TEUs are in-processed at the port, there is another conditional event that activates
after the hurricane begins regarding customer availability. All of the interviewees
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commented on the degraded ability of customers to receive their cargo after the
hurricane. As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2 of this research, the reduced customer
availability was the result of several factors. Power outages translated into an inability for
stores to maintain refrigerated cargo. Fuel shortages reduced the number of deliveries that
could be completed and created the risk of drivers getting stranded without a refuel.
Warehouses were damaged leaving inventory vulnerable to security threats. Given the
accumulation of factors working against business immediately after the hurricane to
receive their ordered cargo, inventory levels at the ports began to swell. The ports were
being used as a temporary satellite storage facility by the consignees or customers until
they were back online and ready to receive their shipments. To model this, a conditional
event was created that filters a percentage of cargo out of the delivery stream and
penalizes it with a 24-hour delay. The penalized cargo is then returned to the stream and
re-enters the same filter for a chance of consecutive penalties or being allowed to pass
through to the delivery trucks for onward movement to the destination. A specific
percentage of available businesses after the hurricane passes as a data point was not
found. Instead, the model was tuned until inventory levels in the port swelled to at least
2000-3000 containers awaiting transport, which was indicated as a salient characteristic
of the historical event from interview responses. It was found that filtering and penalizing
60% of the cargo for two weeks yielded the inventory swell in the port that was described
by interviewees. In other words, 40% of the containers were able to pass through to the
customers, and 60% were retained at the port to simulate the bulk of customers who were
unable to receive their cargo immediately after the disaster. After two weeks all cargo is
released to the trucks to await available resources for transportation. The percentage of
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TEUs filtered and penalized is also used as a throttle that can be adjusted for testing
purposes in the model.
Once TEU entities clear the customer availability event, they are then processed
onto trucks for delivery. Another significant delay reported in the interviews referenced
the temporary road closures that resulted from the hurricane’s wake. Trees, powerlines,
and mudslides in particular, disrupted or completely obstructed many parts of the island’s
roadways. During one interview, a Puerto Rican Guard member commented on how it
took him 4 days to report in to work after the hurricane, simply because he was chain
sawing trees or shoveling mudslides that obstructed the roadways between his home and
his location of employment (Green, 2018). Discussions with the Puerto Rican Guard unit
representative and FEMA employees during the meetings concluded that main roadways
were cleared about 24-48 hours after the hurricane passed. 48 hours after the hurricane
passes through the system, all entities are released from this holding cell to continue
onward movement to trucks.
A one-hour delivery time was used across all carriers for truck delivery. Business
delivery distances were approximately 20 minutes from the port of San Juan. This
estimate was derived from a 20 minutes approximate delivery distance, plus drop off time
of 20 minutes with the customer, and the return trip of another 20 minutes. The trucking
industry was found during this case study to be lacking any sort of formal representation
or unified organization. Trucking networks in Puerto Rico are based on a “I know a guy”
network that is relative to each business who has established relationships with their
regular business partners. The delivery process node is simply a one-hour delay for TEUs
that pass through, which increases the total time an entity is in the system. Once an entity
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passes through the delivery node, it has completed its journey through the entire system
and is disposed on the far-right side of the model.
Crowley coordinated and opened an alternate holding area for HA cargo in a
stadium in the city of Bayamon. The Bayamon stadium received all containers directly
from the Crowley yard as they came off vessels in the port of San Juan. Since the HA
cargo traversing the Crowley yard was competing with normal cargo for resources such
as stacker cranes, HA TEU entities were given a priority within the model so that they are
always processed first before normal cargo when the system has the option between the
two within a queue. Bayamon was opened shortly after the hurricane passed, and thus a
modification to the standard Crowley TEU routing model was added. A series of decision
nodes are presented to the entities that ask whether or not Bayamon is open. If Bayamon
is open, then another question is asked whether the entity passing through is a normal
TEU. If it is a normal TEU then it continues on the upper normal track for truck
processing to customers. If the TEU is not normal, or in other words HA cargo, then the
TEU is routed to the lower track where the HA containers are processed for onward
movement to Bayamon with priority over normal containers. A transit time delay to
Bayamon of 30 minutes is added similar in similar fashion to the transit delays added for
normal cargo to their destinations. The 30 minutes was determined based on the actual
drive time distances quoted in the interviews.
As entities pass through the assignment nodes within the simulation, incremental
changes occur in the variables. For example, when a normal TOTE TEU enters the
system into TOTE’s cargo flow, the TEU entity immediately passes through a node
called “Increase TOTE inventory” that increases the variable “TOTE inventory” by one.
46

As that same entity is shipped and then offloaded from its vessel in the simulated Puerto
Rico section, the entity passes through another node called “TOTE increase deliverable
TEU count” that increases the “TOTE deliverable” variable by one. The deliverable
variables represent the total number of deliverable containers on island in Puerto Rico by
carrier. As the container entity is loaded, trucked, and exits the simulation there is one
last change in the variables that decreases the TOTE inventory and TOTE deliverable
variables each by one. Crowley refers to the carrier, TB refers to the carrier Trailer
Bridge, Ponce refers to an alternate routing for HA entities through the south port of
Ponce by an external carrier, JAX refers to the total inventory across all carriers at the
port of JAX, and Bayamon refers to the HA entities that pass through the simulated
Bayamon yard that branches as an extension from Crowley’s terminal.
The system switches are binary and used to activate and deactivate certain
features within the model. Switches are used to open Bayamon for Crowley, increase
fleet sizes after the hurricane, and delay entities in vessels on the water, awaiting
customer availability, and for road closures. They are activated by creating entities at a
specified simulation date, similar to other creation nodes previously mentioned, using an
expression. An example of the entity creation time expression to start the hurricane would
be: “CalDateToBaseTime(2017,9,20)”, where one entity is created at a start date of 20Sep-2017 within the simulation’s calendar.
A second set of variables in the model capture the number of containers in queue
at a given time in each of the four main queues of each carrier’s respective entity flow.
Four queues for each of the four carriers and Ponce total to 16. The major queues for each
carrier include: the number of containers waiting in the queue for processing into batches
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in JAX, number in queue for loading onto vessels, number in queue for unloading from
vessels, and the number in queue for loading onto trucks.
As the variables fluctuate within the simulation, a system of recorders was
designed to read the pulse of the model using the variables for model validation. The
recorders were activated by an entity that would pass through each node. As the entity
passes through, the node is triggered to record the current value of the given variable at
the time of the entities passing. The values are recorded into an excel file which can then
be reviewed after simulation completion. The entities created for recording variables
were set to flow once per day so as to obtain a daily recording of all values.
As HA TEUs enter the route to Ponce they are subject to the same standardized
PPT used for the other carriers to get through JAX, and then they are subject to a
transportation fleet size and speed equivalent to that of Trailer Bridge. The fleet sizing
and operations of Trailer Bridge seemed comparable to what would likely be used out of
Ponce. After arriving in Puerto Rico via Ponce the TEUs again pass through an
equivalent PPT and truck loading times. One notable feature that is removed from the
Ponce flow is that of customer availability. Since HA is not concerned with a regular
business customer, it is not penalized like normal cargo that has to wait for businesses to
re-open. Instead, HA is trucked directly to Federal Staging Areas (FSA) where federal
employees re-establish accountability of the goods and coordinate transfer of HA
supplies to the state government. The entities in the Ponce flow are subject to the same
delays as the carriers while traveling across the water and roads.
Using the read write function in ARENA daily queue lengths were recorded for
each of the four major processing points in the model: port processing at JAX, batched
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processing onto vessels for transit, unbatched processing off of vessels into San Juan, and
final container processing onto trucks for delivery. These four processing points in the
timeline are multiplied by the four routes a container may take to reach Puerto Rico,
which is via Crowley, TOTE Maritime, Trailer Bridge, or via a fourth external shipper
using the port of Ponce. The number of containers or entities in queue for each of the 16
queues were recorded daily and exported to an excel sheet. Those queue lengths for the
duration of the 12-week simulation were then averaged across the 25 replications of each
simulation. The resulting 25 replication averages over 12 weeks were plotted in multiple
ways and used for the initial analysis.
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Screenshot of the full ARENA model
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Appendix C – ARENA Output
Averages across the 25 replications are used. For example, a data point for a given
day is the average of that data point on that day across the 25 replications.
8 - HA through Ponce

7 - customer availability 90%

6 - customer availability 10%

5 - road delay doubled

4 - HA 40/40/20

3 - HA one third

2 - no bayamon

1 - base 11 sep

0 - base 1 may

System Number Out

46640.16 76259.32 76261.32 75216.24 76054.72 76258.92 76258.36 76260.04 73919.68

Sum of weighted avg VA time
by units entering
by units leaving

104.6543 113.442 113.3151 111.5444 110.9228 113.3765 126.7899 107.8709 114.055
104.2268 113.1669 113.0366 110.7488 110.6672 113.102 126.4374 107.6284 113.1325

Sum of weighted avg Wait time
by units entering
by units leaving

48.70497 127.945 127.5569 120.8028 110.9127 132.1707 175.4955 119.6115 119.1905
48.81755 128.2289 128.028 119.5831 111.0187 132.5065 175.5228 119.9935 108.3514

Sum of weighted avg Total time
by units entering
by units leaving

153.3593 241.387 240.872 232.3472 221.8355 245.5472 302.2855 227.4824 233.2455
153.0444 241.3958 241.0646 230.3319 221.686 245.6085 301.9602 227.622 221.4839

Sum of avg entities
entering system
leaving system
in work

50425
80489
80489
80489
80489
80489
80489
80489
80489
46555.16 76174.32 76176.32 75131.24 75969.72 76173.92 76173.36 76175.04 73834.68
3686.17 9280.597 9268.155 8880.375 8524.435 9439.744 11568.87 8760.198 9484.651

Sum of weighted average times in queue
Sum of avg number in queue

29.65544 52.56763 52.74459 29.6271 30.18722 54.29416 70.43545 55.47805 27.91225
1115.19 4571.595 4564.266 3137.939 3374.052 4734.562 6361.526 4261.783 2363.111

Resource instantaneous utilization sum of averages
excluding Ponce
including Ponce

5.275415 7.818928 7.430721 7.428722 7.473018 7.816312 7.819255 7.817214 6.719297
8.117624

Resource number busy sum of averages
excluding Ponce
including Ponce
Resource scheduled usage utilization sum of averages
excluding Ponce
including Ponce
Resource total seized sum of averages
excluding Ponce
including Ponce

9.361345 15.98637 15.59517 15.00147 15.11578 15.98386 15.98528 15.98395

13.5951
14.99343

5.275415 7.818928 7.430721 7.428722 7.473018 7.816312 7.819255 7.817214 6.719297
8.117624

143704

240249.1 233008.4 230980.4 232730.6 240247.4 240259.3 240249.8 209123.2
228339.2
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